As under the Italian system convictions are not definitive until after at least one level of appeal, the sentence may be amended in a subsequent instance of the legal proceedings. In the meantime, other trials are under way to ascertain who is responsible for the too many collapses that devastated L'Aquila, including the building of the university residence, which crumbled killing eight young students, for whose deaths the prosecution accused four people. However, beyond the legal aspects, this is a story that is bound to leave a deep mark in the debate on the role played by the experts in risk management.
What is now under trial is first and foremost the scientists' incapability to communicate the seismic risk to the population. Possibly in the assumption that the residents were not able to understand or manage the uncertainty, the seismologists of the Commission adopted a paternalistic attitude, making reassuring or trivial statements instead of explaining or providing a context, thus ending up violating the first basic rule of risk communication: never deny or minimise risks. On the other hand, the 31 March meeting did not see the participation from any risk communication expert and the staff of the Italian Civil Protection Agency does not include any professional with such skills. This is a serious shortcoming that the institutions involved in the sensitive issue of emergency management shall have to tackle as soon as possible. Risk communication can save many lives. And now we know that, when mishandled, it can even cause victims.
But that is not all. Even scientists should learn how to communicate, firstly because they have an important social responsibility, especially when they are members of technical-scientific commissions having the task of providing the population with information vital for public safety. And secondly because they are the information sources the citizens trust the most when facing a risk. And in L'Aquila that trust was betrayed.
This story does not hide any attack to science. On the contrary, this is the demonstration of the high regard the civil society has for the opinions of the experts.
Citizens expect scientists to share the knowledge with them, when it may make a difference between life and death. Even when it implies a degree of uncertainty. So that, each one -duly informed -can decide what to do to protect themselves.
Today, crisis communication implies that citizens are informed about the risks, so that they can play a proactive role in the emergency management, taking part in decision-making processes and implementing self-protection measures. To make that happen, however, they should be treated like adults and thoroughly informed in a honestly transparent way.
The L'Aquila story is reminiscent of what happened in Seveso, a town in the vicinity of Milan in July 1976, when in an industrial accident a dioxin cloud was released and hit the population. The Swissowned factory management tried to hide the fact for several days, while the trees in Seveso were turning yellow and children were going to hospital with a chloracne rash on their skin. Following that experience, the European Community adopted the well-known Seveso Directive setting for the first time the right of citizens to be informed on industrial risks. That was in 1982. Today, thirty years after, the L'Aquila story confirms the same principle: in the so-called risk society, access to information is an inalienable right of the citizens. Beyond the legal aspects of the story, the impression is that the lesson from L'Aquila can mark a point of no return in the relations between science and society.
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